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RÉFÉRENCE
Goldstein M.C., A History of Modern Tibet volume 3 : the storm clouds descend 1955-57,
Berkeley, University of California Press 2014
1 The keenly awaited third volume of Melvyn Goldstein’s ‘History of Modern Tibet’ comes
as no disappointment to his loyal readers, and if anything surpasses the earlier volumes
in  its  depth  of  research  and  insight.  The  preface  explains  that  two  volumes  have
become necessary to cover the period 1955-1959 due to the wealth of material available
to the author, and his presentation is indeed illustrated with detailed citations from an
impressive array of sources, notably internal CCP documents, the Kalimpong diaries of
Tsipon Shakabpa and Professor Goldstein’s unique collection of interviews with key
players on the political scene.
2 Goldstein’s work is conducted within a highly conventional narrative style of political
history, focussing on close examination of the words and deeds of élite actors in the
supposed  main  events  of  the  period  — in  this  case,  the  conspiracies  of  émigré
aristocrats in India, the launch of Socialist Reform in Kham/Sichuan, the Dalai Lama’s
visit to India and decision to return, and the debate within the CCP leadership over the
pace of  reform in central  Tibet.  These narratives are constructed with diligent and
competent  attention  to  the  available  sources,  clarifying  and  revealing  information
barely covered by the existing literature.
3 Moreover, this volume is the first to venture much beyond the corridors of power in
Lhasa,  Beijing,  Delhi  and Washington,  by  describing the  Litang uprising,  which the
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author  takes  as  representative  of  the  situation  in  Kham  following  the  premature
introduction of reform, and in my view, the charting of tensions between the central
and  provincial  leaderships  over  this  process  is  the  book’s  most  substantial
contribution.
4 In brief, it argues that Leftist cadres in Sichuan rushed into Socialist Reforms in early
1956 in spite  of  cautions from the central  leadership,  sparking the revolt  they had
sought  to  avoid  (Chapter 3).  Deng  Xiaoping  could  have  averted this  situation,  but
declined to do so, partly for personal reasons (p. 109, 476). Chapter 8 is a fascinating
chronicle of the centre’s attempts to alleviate the damage, sending two missions to
reprimand local cadres and reassure local élites, and calling a high-level meeting in
July 1956 which called for peace negotiations with the rebels. When these failed, and
renewed calls came from the Sichuan provincial and Ganzi prefectural committees to
push ahead with reform, however, the centre acquiesced (March 1957).
5 Goldstein is unusually ambivalent about this decision, ostensibly a critical setback for
‘Mao’s gradualist policy’, praise for which is the dominant theme of volumes 2 and 3 of
his work : after describing the decision as “ill-conceived” (p. 265), and even accepting
that the revolt had popular support (p. 243), he appears to endorse Mao’s justifications
that ‘Tibet’ (i.e., the Lhasa government’s domain) and ‘Ganzi’ (Chinese nomenclature is
used for Tibetan territories outside that domain) were historically different, and that
the process of cancelling ongoing reforms was logistically tiresome and demotivating
for the revolutionary cadre force (p. 270, pp. 475-476).
6 It was a ‘pivotal moment in Sino-Tibetan history’, to use Goldstein’s words, and for the
handful of Tibetan progressives who went along with CCP ideology, the moment when
hope  and  trust  in  its  nationality  policies  ebbed  into  doubt  and  foreboding.  ‘Mao’s
nuanced Tibet policy was seriously undercut by the bloody events in Sichuan’, he writes
(p. 292), with evident sympathy for Tibetan cadres like Jambey Gyatso, who ‘came from
a  poor  family  and  thoroughly  approved  of  implementing  democratic reforms,  but
nonetheless was shocked by the wanton destruction of [Batang Choedé] monastery...’
Many readers will more readily sympathise, especially with the benefit of hindsight,
with the sentiments of the ‘common people’ in Batang, as recalled by Jambey Gyatso
and usefully cited here (p. 239), that “One cannot trust anything the Chinese have said.
Who knows what will happen in the future ? The policy of the CCP is [like] a wet skin
hat.”
7 This is all interesting and informative material, it is just that the broader argument
within which it  is  presented here is overstated and ideologically driven. Goldstein’s
argument is of course richly nuanced, but it shares some basic assumptions with the
historic  CCP  position  on  Tibet,  chiefly  that  ‘democratic  reform’  was  necessary  and
desirable for Tibet, and that had the reactionary Tibetan ruling class not obstructed
reform in the attempt to preserve their privileges and way of life, all would have been
well.  This view tends to confuse ‘democratic reform’ — violent expropriation of the
upper classes, ‘struggle’ against counterrevolutionaries of all classes, and institution of
a  class  dictatorship  run  by  the  Party — with  modernisation  itself,  as  if  Tibet  were
doomed  to  remain  ‘feudal’  and  ‘backward’  forever  without  the  CCP’s  intervention.
Based on these assumptions, the present volume argues that Mao’s ‘gradualist policy’
was  derailed  in  Sichuan  after  zealous  local  cadres  provoked  Tibetan  resistance  by
introducing reform prematurely, but still his decision to indefinitely postpone reform
in proto-TAR was enlightened statesmanship that ‘pulled Tibet back from the brink of
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disaster’ (p. 466). It concludes with a chilling piece of logic, blaming the unholy alliance
of Khamba rebels, reactionary Tibetan aristocrats and the CIA for ‘...bringing about the
total destruction of traditional Tibet’s institutions’ (p. 487) by staging an insurgency !
8 The problem with this interpretation is simply that Mao’s Tibet policy and the debates
within the leadership over the speed of reform were entirely tactical — there was no
debate  about  whether  Tibet  should  enjoy  autonomy  per  se,  just  over  how  long
concessions to the traditional ruling class should be maintained, in order to smooth the
transition to full incorporation in the PRC under the CCP’s undivided authority. Mao in
particular was in a win-win position on this question, having the authority to hold out
for a magnanimous approach, confident that if it went wrong, the issue could always be
resolved  militarily in  China’s  favour,  and  that  is,  as  we  know,  what  eventually
happened.
9 It is quite misleading to suggest that the outcome of this debate, or the willingness of
Tibetan élites to be peacefully won over, were such decisive factors in shaping Tibet’s
fate under Chinese rule. Mao’s speeches and directives (e.g., p. 339, 455) make it clear
that at least from the outbreak of resistance in Sichuan, the ‘gradualist  policy’  was
liable to be cancelled or trumped by hardline approaches as soon as it ran into trouble,
and this was inevitable, given that Tibetan opposition to ‘democratic reform’ was far
more  popular  and  engrained  than  Tibetan  enthusiasm  for  Communism.  So  when
Goldstein postulates that ‘Tibetan history would have taken a very different turn’ had
Deng  Xiaoping  intervened  to  restrain  the  Sichuan  leadership,  one  wonders  how
different  things  could  really  have  been,  especially  on  the  eve  of  the  Anti-rightist
campaign and ‘Great Leap Forward’.
10 Professor  Goldstein  writes  in  his  preface  that  his  research  was  motivated  by  a
determination to ‘disprove entrenched beliefs and widely held stereotypes’, a laudable
and welcome endeavour, but one that seems not to extend to the CCP’s claims. For
example :  despite acknowledging the relevance of  events and personages in eastern
Tibet in volume 3, his discussion is prefaced by a laboured and confused defence of the
Chinese government’s position that areas of Tibet outside the effective borders of the
latter-day Ganden Potrang state are only ethnically Tibetan and cannot be considered
part  of  the  same  country  (p. 79-87).  He  marshalls  support  for  this  view  from
mid-20th century foreign observers and scholars (Kolmas, Petech, Ekvall, Teichmann,
Richardson, etc.), who confirm that Tibetan polities east of the Dri Chu river in Kham
were not under Lhasa’s direct authority during the later Qing era, but this is hardly in
dispute, and none of these authors seem to have shared his conclusion that eastern
Tibet’s identity was somehow less Tibetan than other parts of the plateau.
11 The historical details of war and diplomacy that produced the state of affairs prevailing
between China and Tibet in 1949 are naturally complex, but simply put, the fact that
eastern Tibet was not part of Ganden Potrang territory does not mean that it was part
of China either. The territory ruled by the Lhasa government was larger and grander
than other Tibetan polities, and had a long border with British India, but it was no
more intrinsically Tibetan than those in the east, nor had it been any less prone to
imperial hegemony under the Qing. The distinction between territories ruled by Lhasa
and those under other Tibetan rulers, all with varying degrees of independence from
neighbouring powers, needs no introduction ; but the claim that the former should be
designated ‘Tibet’ while the latter should not, because they were vassals of late imperial
China, does not bear historical examination.
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12 Having  raised  it,  I  should  mention  one  other  instance  of  this  intellectual
gerrymandering, although it is incidental to the subject of the book. In the preamble to
his discussion of the Sino-Indian agreement (p. 158), Goldstein writes that at the 1914
Simla Convention ‘British India acquired an area of about fifty thousand square miles
from Tibet that was then called NEFA...’ In fact, the territory ceded by Tibet at Simla
was  known  to  Tibetans  as  ‘the  three  valleys  under  the  passes’  (La  ’og  yul  gsum),
including the Tawang valley, an area of about three and a half thousand square miles,
or 7 % of NEFA, the present Arunachal Pradesh. If one includes the little Pachakshri
enclave  in  West  Siang  district,  which  also  came  under  Lhasa’s  jurisdiction  in  the
18th century, Tibetan-controlled territory in NEFA before 1950 could amount to 8 %.
13 It could hardly escape an historian that none of the remaining 92 % or so of NEFA/
Arunachal had ever been controlled by Tibet, nor was it claimed by Tibet at Simla. It
has however been claimed by the PRC, without discernable justification, since the late
1950s. Goldstein’s elision of Tawang with NEFA, backed up by a map (no. 5) showing
Tibet’s pre-1914 border running along the north bank of the Brahmaputra, seems far
removed  from  the  spirit  of  historical  enquiry,  never  mind  any  quest  to  ‘disprove
entrenched beliefs’, and is the kind of thing that unfortunately undermines the overall
integrity of his work.
14 To conclude, volume 3 is a great contribution to knowledge of the period. Apart from
the tensions over Tibet policy within the CCP discussed above, it gives us fly-on-the-
wall coverage of the amateurish attempts by Shakabpa and Gyalo Dondrup to woo the
Indian and US establishments, the most detailed portrait of Alo Chondze yet published,
a  Chinese  perspective  on  the  Litang  uprising,  and  a  preliminary  account  of  the
dismantling of Fan Ming’s reforms in proto-TAR, among other readings, based on rare
Chinese and Tibetan language sources.  If  one ignores the presumptuous title of the
series, and the axe-grinding tone of the narrative, it is an informative read for anyone
with a sustained interest in the subject.
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